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 This thesis explores the history of the Taiwanese independence movement, particularly 
focusing upon the relationship between the creation of a Taiwanese nationalism and the 
communist movement. This is accomplished via examining the earliest historiographic writing 
centered on Taiwan and comparing it with the dominant views of Taiwan in Chinese Nationalist 
Party (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) historiography, which demonstrates how the 
original Taiwanese nationalism was derived from a Marxist historical narrative. The history of 
this socialist nationalism is then deployed as a foil to critique both KMT and CCP narratives of 
Taiwan and its place in China’s history. The history of the Taiwanese Communist Party is 
explored in depth, particularly its relationship with the independence movement, the CCP, and 
the Japanese Communist Party. The communist origin of Taiwanese nationalism destabilizes the 
dominant discourse of “One China,” and illustrates how nationalism is sometimes, paradoxically, 
the only thing that can resist other more oppressive nationalisms. 
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The Taiwanese nation now faces the two enemies of the Chiang Nationalist 
Warlord, with his fascist colonialism, and the socialist imperialism of Chinese 
Communists. —Su Beng1 
Su Beng’s views reflect the depth of Taiwanese independence brainwashing’s 
poisonous influence on individuals, but the fact that there is only one China 
cannot change. —Xinhua, the PRC’s state news agency2 
 
 On September 20th 2019, the Marxist historian and Taiwanese independence activist who 
wrote the first history of Taiwan that took Taiwan as its center instead of China, Su Beng, died of 
pneumonia in Taipei at the age of 100.3 Two days before his death, the sitting president of the 
ROC, Tsai Ying-wen, paid him a visit in the hospital, assuring him that she would continue to 
fight Taiwan’s battle for independence from the PRC. It may seem surprising at first that Su 
Beng, a former communist revolutionary, and Tsai Ying-wen, the leader of the broadly neo-
liberal Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), would see each other as allies, as their politics have 
nothing in common beyond advocating for Taiwanese independence, but this is not an 
uncommon phenomenon. Although today the Taiwanese independence/nationalist movement 
and its accompanying discourses are firmly located within the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), which is based on a political ideology of Liberalism, the roots of the movement lie firmly 
planted in the Taiwanese communist movement, of which Su Beng was a member of, much to 
the chagrin of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  
 
1 Su, Beng. Taiwan’s 400 Year History. 98. 
2 “103岁台独大佬史明去世 曾被痛批白活一生,” n.d. http://www.xinhuajiaodian.com/news/detail?id=3181. 
3 Horton, Chris. “Su Beng, a Father of Taiwan Independence, Dies at 100.” The New York Times, October 4, 2019, 
sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/world/asia/su-beng-dead.html. 
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 Su Beng was a well-known figure in the Taiwanese political arena, whose advocacy for 
Taiwanese independence was so vociferous that official spokespersons of the People’s Republic 
of China often felt the need to address him directly. The PRC’s Xinhua News Agency published 
a highly condescending “obituary” for him in which they quoted an official spokesperson for the 
PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office as saying: “Regardless of whether Su Beng travels all over to every 
country in the world, I am afraid there is no place called the State of Taiwan.”4 It is evident from 
this statement that the CCP officials fail to understand the objective of Su Beng’s life’s work, 
and completely misunderstand why an old Marxist like him could be popular with young liberals 
in Taiwan today. His popularity and influence is not due to arguing that a Taiwanese state 
already exists (even though this is technically true), but rather from the history he wrote that 
argues for the 400+ year existence of a separate Taiwanese nation, which laid the groundwork 
for the construction of an imagined Taiwanese community.  
Su Beng’s narrative presents Taiwan as a perpetual periphery to various empires; Dutch 
periphery, Spanish periphery, Qing periphery, Japanese periphery, ROC periphery, to world 
periphery (excluded from UN, WHO, etc), but what is too contemporary for Su Beng to have 
accounted for in his original narrative is that as Taiwan’s economy develops, Taishang5 turn 
mainland China into their own periphery (exploited by Foxconn, Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Company, etc). He argues that it is this unique 400 year experience of periphery 
that has generated an authentic Taiwanese nation, although it should be noted that at this time it 
is questionable that any significant number of Taiwanese people felt they were a nation of their 
own. Despite the Marxist argument that he makes, which strongly echoes Marx’s idea that the 
 
4 “103岁台独大佬史明去世 曾被痛批白活一生,” n.d. http://www.xinhuajiaodian.com/news/detail?id=3181. 
5 台商, Taiwanese investors/entrepreneurs in the PRC. 
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consciousness of men is the product of their material circumstances,6 the objective circumstances 
in Taiwan at the time (i.e. the lack of a widespread Taiwanese national identity) reveal that Su 
Beng was himself actively engaging in the creation of an imagined community that did not exist 
previously. This study aims to trace the construction of this imagined community by Taiwanese 
socialists by comparing the development of the idea of a Taiwanese nation with the development 
of CCP Chinese nationalism in the mainland. 
Any discussion of Taiwanese nationalism and identity must engage with the recent work 
of Evan Dawley, who is a major scholar in the newly emerging field of Taiwan studies. His 
book, Becoming Taiwanese, traces the genesis of a unique Taiwanese ethnic identity in the port 
city of Keelung, in which he attempts to move the study of Taiwanese identity beyond the 
confines of presentist, nation-state centered history and into a type of history centered on the 
construction of a Taiwanese conscious by individuals and their understanding of themselves vis-
à-vis the state that was administering the island (e.g. the Japanese Empire, Nationalist China, 
etc.). He argues against the notion that ethnic identities are nonmodern or only become a part of 
modernity when they evolve into ethnonationalism, and that the birth of Taiwanese ethnic 
identity was a fundamentally modern process, inextricably linked to the modernizing projects of 
both the KMT and Japanese colonial administration. Departing from traditional textually-based 
analysis of identity, he instead adopts a performative approach, based upon the idea that “people 
manifest their identity through their actions when they act in ways that contrast with or oppose 
prescribed behavior, maintain particular behaviors outside of their initial historical context, or 
modify specific activities to accord with new circumstances without abandoning them in favor of 
 
6 Marx, Karl. The German Ideology, n.d. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-
ideology/ch01a.htm. 
 
 4  
 
newly invented traditions.”7 For Dawley, as well as the Taiwanese Marxists at the center of this 
study, Taiwanese ethnic consciousness was formed in opposition to the nationalisms of China 
and Japan, and is defined by this opposition.  
Although the work of Evan Dawley is well researched and convincing, this study will 
examine Taiwan and Taiwanese consciousness within a very different framework. The bulk of 
recent historical scholarship on Taiwan focuses on identity and is written in such a way that the 
vast majority of it almost seems to be primarily intended to justify/defend Taiwanese claims to 
an “authentic” identity, but this seems to me to be counterproductive. As Prasenjit Duara 
discusses in his work on Manchukuo, what does it mean for an identity to be “authentic?”8 Is 
there even such a thing? I would argue that this is not the case, especially in light of Fredrick 
Cooper’s work on identity, where he argues that identity is too nebulous and ill-defined a 
concept to deploy it as an analytical category in scholarship.9 This study does not take Taiwanese 
ethnic or national identity as its subject, but rather the construction of Taiwanese nationalism, 
which is to say that the focus is not upon the subjectivity of Taiwanese people and how they 
interpret themselves as part of a particular nation or ethnic group. Instead, the aim is to examine 
the motivations and strategies of those individuals and movements who sought to forge a nation 
where previously there was none, as well as the process by which they went about achieving this. 
Widespread identification with Taiwanese nationalism is a recent phenomenon that only really 
began to take place after the end of martial law in the late 1980’s, which developed 
contemporaneously with an explosion of scholarship that sought to promote just such a 
nationalism after the lifting of state censorship. I argue that Taiwanese nationalism has been, 
 
7 Dawley, Becoming Taiwanese. 17. 
8 Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity. 
9 Cooper, Colonialism in Question. 
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very transparently, actively constructed by activists and intellectuals since that time, and 
accordingly this study seeks to explore the earliest attempts to construct Taiwanese nationalism 
by Taiwanese leftists, which occurred well before the end of martial law and during the Japanese 
colonial period. The objective of this study is not only to examine Taiwanese nationalism as a 
case study of how nationalism is constructed (a la Prasenjit Duara’s work on Manchukuo), but 
also to put in dialogue two narratives: Taiwanese leftists’ narratives that construct an imagined 
community of a Taiwanese nation and CCP narratives of Chinese and Taiwanese history. The 
Marxists’ attempts at this kind of construction resist both Chinese communist and nationalist 
narratives of Taiwan and Chinese nationalism more broadly and serve as a challenge to the 
claims to “authenticity” of Chinese or any other brand of nationalism.  
This study was undertaken because of the author’s own interest in Taiwanese nationalism 
and East Asian Marxism, which was initially imagined as a very niche topic that would 
contribute to those two fields of study, but over time the multiplicity of ways in which this 
project intersected with the transnational became ever more apparent. Taiwan itself is an 
inherently transnational subject, due to the way it exists in the borderlands of multiple empires 
and the counter-intuitiveness of a nationalism for such a place serving as a foil to seemingly 
more stable nationalisms, and the communist movement of the 20th century is famously 
predicated on a truly global revolution. As my investigations progressed, it became clear that this 
topic had significance well beyond the field of East Asian studies, with the possibility to be a 
meaningful contribution to studies of colonization, nationalism, and colonial communists 
movements, as well as being extremely relevant to contemporary geopolitical developments. 
The rise of right-wing populist and nationalist movements (e.g. the election of Donald 
Trump, Brexit, etc.) around the world is intimately linked to the contemporary situation in 
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Taiwan. The Taiwanese independence movement mirrors such movements around the world in 
its staunch opposition to globalism, but primarily its opposition to any kind of close economic 
relationship with China. US President Donald Trump has become regarded as a hero and 
champion of democracy by young independence activists and freedom fighters in Taiwan as well 
as Hong Kong. Freddy Lim, an international rockstar, member of the legislative yuan, and leader 
of the New Power Party that emerged from the Sunflower Movement; was invited to and 
attended Donald Trump’s inauguration,10 which in addition to his phone call with President Tsai 
Ying-wen was an unprecedented break from the way every American administration since Nixon 
had kowtowed to the CCP.11 Similarly, during the Hong Kong protests that first erupted in 2019 
there were multiple occasions of protestors marching while carrying images or effigies of 
Trump,12 or directly appealing to him or thanking him in interviews. The fact that figures or 
movements such as Donald Trump and the forces that elected him could ever be seen as 
emancipatory or as a champion against authoritarianism must no doubt come as a shock to 
westerners, especially intellectuals, but this is the genuine sentiment of people who have long felt 
abandoned by the traditional western political establishment that espoused self-determination and 
democracy, but at the same time was selling vibrant democratic societies in East Asia down the 
river to the PRC in the name of Francis Fukuyama’s End of History. All of which was done out 
of a mistaken belief that, as Margert Thatcher said when asked to justify the Hong Kong 
 
10 Strong, Matthew. “Ex-Premier to Represent Taiwan at Trump Inaug...” Taiwan News, December 23, 2016. 
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3057192. 
 
11 Gearan, Anne, Philip Rucker, and Simon Denyer. “Trump’s Taiwan Phone Call Was Long Planned, Say People 
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handover, “You can’t just be partially free,”13 by which she meant that economic liberalization 
would eventually lead to political liberalization. This study will hopefully contribute to 
scholarship of this nature on contemporary populist and anti-globalist political movements. 
The ultimate importance of studying the Taiwanese independence movement, however, 
lies within the potential of such studies to further the cause of peaceful Cross-Strait relations, 
although this task will, in my opinion, ultimately prove futile. During a seminar I was part of the 
group which was discussing the periodization of pre and postwar with regards to the second 
World War and someone asked, “Are we still in the post-war period?” To which I responded, 
“No, we’re in the pre-war period.” This statement elicited a great deal of laughter from the 
group, but I intended it as a serious one. The CCP leadership does not operate off rational logic, 
they are possessed by a teleological understanding of history that places the annexation of 
Taiwan as the most important goal for the whole society, a goal that must be accomplished at all 
costs, which I will provide evidence for in a later section of the thesis. The likelihood of Taiwan 
peacefully entering into union with the PRC is essentially zero, which correspondingly raises the 
likelihood of invasion immensely. Such an invasion would almost surely see the intervention of 
the United States and her East Asian allies, leading to the kind of destruction that the world has 
not known since the 1940’s.  
Luo Yuan, a Rear Admiral in the People’s Liberation Army Navy who holds an academic 
position responsible for drafting PLAN military doctrine, has publicly stated that the United 
States is a paper tiger, and that the PLAN need only sink a US Navy aircraft carrier or two and 
 
13 Much like Francis Fukuyama, she meant that the liberal economic system of Hong Kong would ignite 
liberalization in China after the handover, and economic liberalization would inevitably lead to social and 
democratic liberalization.  
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the spirit of the American public will be broken, there will be no war.14 This bears a shocking 
resemblance to the thinking within the Japanese Imperial Navy before they carried out their 
attack on Pearl Harbor. This sort of misplaced confidence and the belief that one’s enemies are 
decadent and spiritually weak are exactly the kinds of mistaken ideas that would lead one to 
launch a first strike on a very powerful enemy. As I will explain in Chapter 1, the CCP 
leadership does not even understand the motivations and resolve of those who oppose them in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, but their understanding of their Western enemies’ motivations and 
resolve seems to be even worse. Wang Huning, a close ally of Xi and the politburo’s head 
propogandist, after attending a football game at the US Naval Academy wrote the following: 
The Americans pay attention to strength. Football has some strategy, but it’s not elegant; 
mainly, it relies on strength. The Americans apply that spirit to many fields, including the 
military, politics, and the economy.15 
This statement reflects a total lack of understanding on his part of the phenomenon on which he 
is commenting.16 Such ignorance drastically increases the chance of war, and so the ultimate goal 
of this study is to clearly articulate the ideology, beliefs, and motivations of Taiwanese 
independence activists, and also PRC nationalists to a limited extent, with the hope that better 
understanding can avert the tragedy of war or other conflicts.  
 
14 Lockie, Alex. “China Sets the Stage for a ‘bloody Nose’ Attack on US Aircraft Carriers, but It Would Backfire 
Horribly.” Business Insider, January 11, 2019. https://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-threats-to-attack-us-aircraft-
carriers-would-backfire-horribly-2019-1. 
 
15 Osnos, Evan. “The Future of America’s Contest with China.” The New Yorker, January 6, 2020. 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/01/13/the-future-of-americas-contest-with-china. 
 
16 American football is the most complex sport in terms of strategy, players are required to memorize entire books of 
plays, and the coaching and play calling is as important as the physical abilities of the players. Wang also attended a 
football games at a service academy, whose football teams are famous for having players who are much smaller and 
weaker than their opponents and relying on trick plays and outside-the-box strategy to overcome that deficit.   
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Methodology 
 The scope of this study has been limited by the lack of availability of sources relevant to 
the Taiwanese Communist Party in the United States, most of said sources are located in 
Japanese archives in Tokyo, Taiwanese archives in Taipei, and Soviet archives in Moscow. 
There has been little in the way of English scholarship written on the topic, perhaps its 
mentioned in a paragraph or two here and there, but only once or twice has it even been the 
subject of even a journal article, let alone a whole book. One interested in this topic also faces 
the problems born of the unique political position they inhabited—both the KMT and CCP found 
it convenient to destroy any record of the party as its mere existence destabilizes their respective 
narratives of Chinese nationalism and Taiwan’s place in Chinese history. The only truly 
disinterested party involved with the TCP was the Japanese Imperial government, which kept 
detailed records on Taiwanese political movements through their networks of informants, seized 
correspondence with JCP leaders, and court records. Consequently, the majority of sources one 
could draw upon for a study such as this one are written in Japanese, of which the author has a 
rudimentary grasp. Chinese or English translations of said Japanese sources were substituted in 
order to make up for this deficiency. 
 Even the writings of prominent Taiwanese TCP supporters and leftist intellectuals were 
generally composed in Japanese first, the location that served as the capital of the Taiwanese 
independence movement in exile during the White Terror period and where they were originally 
published. Chinese translations were used for this study instead of the originals, English 
translations were generally unacceptable because of the extent to which they have been abridged. 
In addition to the works of prominent figures like Su Beng, I also drew upon scholarly books on 
the TCP published in Chinese in Taiwan; these sorts of sources were extremely helpful because 
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they often contained Chinese translations of TCP documents that were originally written in 
Japanese (e.g. the party platform, correspondence, etc.). Sometimes contemporary Chinese or 
English language newspaper articles are incorporated to show the connection of the TCP to the 
modern independence movement in Taiwan or just to situate it within the contemporary 
discourse. The remaining sources that I have used in the writing of this study are English 
language scholarly books and articles; usually they are written on topics other than the TCP but I 
have been able to infer much from reading such a large swathe of information related to broader 
topics. Unfortunately, it was not possible to utilize much in the way of primary sources, due to 
my residing in the United States while writing this, and even the use of English language 
secondary scholarship was severely constrained by the 2020 severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic.  
 The methodology itself is quite simple—I am simply drawing upon the theories of 
nationalism and its relationship to historiographic writing as discussed by numerous scholars 
throughout the past few decades.17 I use the writings of TCP supporters, Taiwanese historians, as 
well as the history of the TCP itself to demonstrate how nationalism is created and the 
deployment of historical writing to achieve this. Later these processes in Taiwan and the TCP 
will be compared to similar processes in China and Japan, to highlight the many ways in which 
Taiwan is a unique case that is deserving of much greater scholarly attention. This study is 
greatly constrained by a lack of sources, so it became necessary to examine history-writing itself 
as a topic, which in the end has greatly enriched the depth and analysis of this thesis. 
  
 
17 The actual discussion of theory will come a bit further into the next section. 
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Chapter 1 
Nationalism and History in Contemporary Taiwan 
To properly set the stage, we must examine Taiwanese society and cross-strait relations 
since the late 1980’s in more depth. Since the beginning of the opening and reform policies in the 
PRC and democratization in Taiwan, PRC policy towards Taiwan has been largely consistent, 
but ROC policy towards the mainland has been wildly inconsistent. The PRC began to try and 
encourage Taiwanese investors to build factories in Fujian province during the beginning of the 
opening and reform period, specifically in a special economic zone setup for them in Xiamen, by 
offering cheap labor and tax breaks, as well as the opportunity to hire factory workers that speak 
the same language as them (Mandarin or Hokkien). The ROC government did not legalize trade 
with China until 1990 under Lee Teng-Hui. The economic conditions were generally good in 
Taiwan from the 1980’s on, but began to slow by the mid-1990’s, with GDP growth hitting a 
record low in 1996. Taiwan and the mainland were beginning to grow noticeably interdependent, 
but most industries were unconcerned.18 
In 1992 the ROC and PRC governments engaged in preliminary negotiations to restart 
cross-strait dialogue, resulting in the ’92 consensus, whereby both parties recommitted 
themselves to the “one-china principle,” albeit even then the ROC government stated that its 
interpretation of the principle was different than the PRC’s. Cross-strait relations were generally 
good until 1994, when Lee intimated his idea of a separate Taiwanese national identity during an 
interview with a Japanese newspaper, which raised a great deal of alarm among the leaders of the 
CCP. Exacerbating the situation, Lee instituted his “go south” policy to encourage businesses to 
 
18 Lin. 56-57. 
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invest in Southeast Asia instead of China. The PRC took a conciliatory approach at first, when in 
1995 Jiang Zemin sent an 8 point peace offering to Lee, pledging an end to hostilities and 
pleading for Taiwan to rejoin the mainland under the “one country, two systems” framework 
developed by Deng Xiaoping. Lee responded by agreeing to all points, with the caveat that 
reunification could not begin until both governments and parties committed themselves to 
democracy. Lee’s response enraged the CCP, whom he obviously knew could not accept his 
proposal, and the hardliners within the party took control of cross-strait policy.19 In response, the 
PLA conducted missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996, resulting in the Western 
powers denouncing the PRC for its military aggression. As a direct result, Lee announced his “no 
haste” policy, which was a plan to severely restrict investment and trade with China, and banned 
many industries from doing business there, which was agreed upon by both the leaders of the 
KMT and the DPP. For the rest of Lee’s time as president the relations between the ROC and 
PRC would remain strained.  
 In 1999, DPP candidate Chen Shui-Bian was elected president of the ROC. He 
was a man the CCP regarded with absolute suspicion, as the DPP had traditionally been 
committed to democracy and Taiwanese independence. Chen was the first non-KMT politician 
to rule the ROC, and took office during a particularly hard time in 2000. China was still taking a 
hardline stance against Taiwan, and the economy was performing poorly. These issues (perhaps 
as well as low poll ratings) led Chen to decide to liberalize economic relations with the mainland 
again, which he referred to as his “active opening” policy. The CCP refused to change its 
hardline approach, and so Chen began removing images and statues of Chiang Kai-Shek and 
other mainland ROC leaders from the country, and embarking on a general campaign of 
 
19 Lin. 64. 
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“Taiwan-ization.” In response, the PRC passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, which 
committed the government to invading Taiwan if the ROC government made any moves towards 
independence. In 2006 Chen won reelection, but relations with China remained cold and his 
administration was wracked by corruption and scandal. Due to the little positive response he 
received for his “active opening” policy, he decided to enact a new more restrictive policy 
towards China called “Active Management, Effective Opening” in order to strengthen his 
support among the DPP’s base. At the same time as the new restrictions were being imposed, he 
launched the “name rectification” campaign to replace “China” in government titles for the 
country with “Taiwan.” PRC policy ultimately remained designed to isolate Taiwan 
internationally, blocking trade deals and participation in international organizations throughout 
all of Chen’s two terms. 
 Elected in 2007 and sworn in in 2008, Chen’s successor, Ma Ying-Jeou, returned 
power in Taiwan to the KMT. The PRC was much more receptive to Ma than to either of his two 
predecessors, allowing Ma to immediately begin formulating and then launch a campaign of 
economic liberalization with regards to China. As the world economy deteriorated during the 
global financial crisis of 2008, Ma decided to focus all his efforts on cross-strait liberalization, 
proclaiming that this policy was the best way to fix Taiwan’s devastated economy. The pace of 
liberalization surprised many, as Ma’s administration very quickly negotiated for direct sea, air, 
and telephone links between the mainland and Taiwan for the first time since the end of the 
Chinese Civil War. Ma began negotiations to formalize all these agreements and liberalize even 
more; this agreement took the form of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA), which was passed in 2010. The ECFA would for the first time allow mainland Chinese 
investment in Taiwan, and not just the other way around, and was extremely controversial. It and 
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its 2014 follow up agreement, the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), directly led 
to the creation of student protests that would become the Sunflower Movement. Although these 
protests failed to prevent the passing of the CSSTA, they would effectively serve to hobble Ma 
for the remainder of his last term in office. 
The Sunflower Movement was the first public political movement in Taiwan to clearly 
demonstrate all the major objections to integration with the mainland that I will discuss in this 
paper, and was also the first time that the reasoning behind said objections was made so clear. 
The first and most obvious objection to the CSSTA was to the secretive nature in which it was 
drafted; Ma never publicly stated he would pursue a cross-strait policy of integration that 
extreme, and therefore they felt it was an undemocratic policy that should be put to a public vote, 
if not scrapped entirely. This aspect of the Sunflower Movement best demonstrates the gulf that 
has formed between the mainland and Taiwan in terms of their political development and 
culture. Unlike Hong Kong which never had true democracy before the handover, it appears 
impossible that the Taiwanese would ever accept an electoral system where half or more of the 
representatives were elected by functional constituencies (i.e. by major industries; in Hong Kong 
the finance industry has its own representative in the Legislative Council) designed to guarantee 
that the legislature is pro-business, and therefore pro-Beijing. Furthermore, integration with the 
mainland was so despised that the protesters brought Ma Ying-Jeou’s administration, an 
administration that was elected into office on a seventeen-point margin of victory and reelected 
by a still healthy six-point margin, to a grinding halt, sending out a clear signal that a less 
democratic government would not be tolerated for even a moment. The democratic spirit that 
Taiwanese have and are now accustomed to would most likely render Taiwan ungovernable for 
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the PRC or an administration as strongly pro-Beijing as those that have held power in Hong 
Kong. 
The second major objection of the Sunflower Movement to the CSSTA was on economic 
grounds, again with many of the predictions of its effects made by looking at how Hong Kong 
has been affected by close economic integration with the PRC. Prior to the CSSTA, mainland 
investment in Taiwan was essentially banned, and the discourse around cross-strait policy was 
exclusively centered on how relaxed the regulations should be concerning Taiwanese investment 
in the mainland. With the ECFA and CSSTA, which were negotiated in secret, Ma Ying-Jeou 
and the KMT unilaterally decided to permit mainland investment for the first time. This caused a 
violent response in the public, who were furious that they were not even consulted about this 
policy before its proposal. Critics pointed to what mainland speculators had done to the real 
estate market in Hong Kong by constructing enormous quantities of luxury apartments that the 
vast majority of Hong Kong people cannot ever even hope to afford, exacerbating a housing 
shortage that had left over 50,000 people living in cage housing by 2007.20 This would now be a 
possibility in Taiwan as well due to the measures in the CSSTA which mandated free movement 
of capital between the mainland and Taiwan. Furthermore, there was the fear that mainland 
companies, or Taiwanese companies in which they have significant investment, might purchase 
some or even all major media outlets, similar to what has happened in Hong Kong, leaving the 
mainstream media with a strong pro-Beijing bias. According to Reporters Without Borders’ 
World Press Freedom Index, Hong Kong has dropped from being ranked 18th in the world in 
 
20
 “Number of Persons Living in Cage Housing.” Social Indicators of Hong Kong, The Hong Kong Council of 
Social Service, Accessed Oct. 2017, socialindicators.org.hk/en/indicators/housing/8.11 
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press freedom in 2002 to 73rd in 2017.21 Beijing has made its policy towards Taiwan based 
around political influence through economic influence and integration, and the Sunflower 
Movement brought this inescapable truth to the forefront of the political discourse. The CSSTA 
was also opposed due to the perceived negative effect on working class people by the previously 
passed ECFA, which the Ma administration predicted would create over 263,000 jobs, but as of 
2014, when the CSSTA was proposed, had not decreased unemployment, confirming the fears of 
some analysts that the ECFA would eliminate as many jobs as it created.22 
The purpose of sketching out the political relationship of Taiwan to the PRC is to 
demonstrate that the CCP leadership is far from the hyper-rational technocrats that they (and the 
western media) portray them to be. This is evident from examining how they manage efforts 
towards reunification of Taiwan, but even more so from the spectacular failure of the leadership 
to understand the protests that started in Hong Kong in the summer of 2019. The British 
Consulate worker Simon Cheng, who was abducted by the state while visiting the mainland for 
participating in the protests, described how the kidnapped protesters were imprisoned (in 
violation of Hong Kong’s Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong) and 
tortured, but the line of interrogation was always something like: “Who is paying you to do this? 
Are you working for the CIA?”23 This report in isolation might not seem to indicate much, but 
when viewed in light of the devastating loss that the pro-mainland politicians suffered in the 
2019 local elections in Hong Kong, and the fact that reportedly the CCP leadership was caught 
 
21
 “Media Freedom in Free Fall 20 Years after Hong Kong Returned to China.” Reporters Without Borders, 
Reporters Without Borders, 26 July 2017, rsf.org/en/news/media-freedom-free-fall-20-years-after-hong-kong-
returned-china. 
22 Lin. 221. 
23Fan, Wenxin. “Former U.K. Consulate Employee Says Chinese Secret Police Tortured Him.” Wall Street Journal, 
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completely off guard by this,24 it begins to become clear that the modern CCP views the same 
phenomenon as the ultimate font of all evil in Chinese society as did Mao Zedong and Li Dazhao 
going back to the beginning of the party: jingshen wuran25 (spiritual pollution), the 
contamination of good Chinese subjects by the insidious beliefs and values of the western other. 
Implicit in this idea is that no “real” Chinese person (to include Hong Kong and Taiwanese 
people as well as mainlanders) could ever look at the great economic prosperity that the CCP has 
achieved, and their self-purported role as the liberators of all Chinese people from foreign 
domination26, and rationally of their own free will choose to oppose the party or its regime. 
Opposition to the CCP is all held as the result of brainwashing or bribery by the colonizer or 
other foreign powers, not having been properly educated on what the CCP has done for China, or 
simply mental illness. Such a marked inability to, or lack of desire to, understand the thought 
process of one’s enemies has characterized those regimes which have perpetrated the most 
horrific instances of violence in history, to be committed by loyal party agents, all in the name of 
the nation. 
 
Contemporary Scholarship on Nationalism 
No discussion of the formation or construction of a nationalism would be complete 
without an examination of Benedict Anderson’s contributions to the field in his opus, Imagined 
Communities. Andersons’ idea is essentially that the nation is an “imagined community” (i.e. the 
 




26 It is questionable how much the CCP or the KMT contributed to the defeat of the Japanese in World War II. 
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people that compose it do not actually know each other, as the community is too large to function 
in the way a real local community does, and as a result functions in a very religious way, with 
the nation as the moral and spiritual center of the nationalist cosmology), and is created through 
print capitalism and the circulation of officials throughout the bureaucracy of the polity. The idea 
of nationalism arising from the circulation of individuals within a broader network has 
interesting implications in the case of Taiwanese nationalism in the Taiwanese Communist Party, 
as TCP members circulated within the transnational networks of the international communist 
movement, and perhaps their nationalism arose in this manner, but this is beyond the scope of 
this study.  
Anderson’s ideas become most relevant to this study when examined in dialogue with 
Prasenjit Duara’s work on Machukuo in Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East 
Asian Modern. Duara develops the notion of an imagined community as something that can be 
actively created, best exemplified by the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria, and attempts to 
interrogate what makes an imagined community or nationalism “authentic.” This process is 
especially transparent in Manchukuo, as the nation was constructed purely as a justification for 
the Japanese to seize the mineral wealth of northeastern China. The creation of an “authentic” 
Manchurian nation-state was a massive undertaking that required the work of ethnologists, 
historians, literary scholars and countless others; a great act of collective fiction writing. 
Interestingly, there are a number of parallels to be found between the construction of Manchukuo 
nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism. Both were created with the goal of imagining territory 
and people out of China, the key distinction being that Manchukuo nationalism was created and 
imposed by the Japanese, whereas Taiwanese nationalism was and is voluntary. Indeed, many 
Taiwanese nationalists, such as former ROC President Lee Teng-hui, will also often state that 
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they feel they are more Japanese than Chinese, and that they would much prefer to return to 
Japanese rule than to be grafted onto the PRC. Many Taiwanese people claim that the fifty years 
as a colony “civilized” them, and that this is what makes them superior to mainlanders. They are 
also increasingly attempting to turn to the most “authentic” Taiwanese people, the aborigines, 
lionizing their culture and attempting to prove some sort of blood or genetic link to them that 
would separate them from mainland Han people, which resonates deeply with the way the 
Japanese turned to the Tungusic tribespeople to find the “authentic” Manchurian. The 
nationalism of the Taiwanese Communist Party was supported by the Japanese Communist 
Party, of which the TCP was originally a branch, and as a result also resembles that of 
Manchukuo, to an extent.27 
For Duara, all nationalisms are inherently inauthentic as they are all constructed and 
ahistorical, but this does not make nationalism necessarily a negative phenomenon. Eric 
Hobsbawm’s argues that there are two primary forms of nationalism, an expansive and 
incorporative nationalism that welcomes all so long as they ascribe to the same enlightened 
values that the nation is founded upon, and a limiting nationalism that seeks to exclude the nation 
from the other. For Hobsbawm, this incorporative nationalism is good, while the excluding 
nationalism is xenophobic and inherently bad. In light of this, I argue that although I agree that 
Chinese nationalists in the PRC are correct in their assessment that Taiwanese nationalism in 
inauthentic, this is irrelevant, because Taiwanese nationalism is an inherently liberating and 
positive phenomenon due to its incorporative nature and what it is constructed in opposition to: 
the equally ahistorical construction of Han Chinese nationalism which consolidates itself through 
the refusal to recognize any alterity within Chinese speaking peoples. If Taiwanese nationalism 
 
27 Liu, “Aboriginal Fractions.” 
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is inauthentic, then surely a Han Chinese nationalism that was, as William Rowe argues in 
China’s Last Empire, created in reaction to a Manchu ethnic identity that was itself constructed 
in order to administer the Qing Empire is equally inauthentic. Contemporary Taiwanese 
nationalists seeks to incorporate and accept all the peoples and influences that have played a role 
in the island’s history, presenting Taiwan as a melting pot of Chinese, Japanese, Aboriginal, and 
Western cultures where all are accepted.28 
This incorporative nationalism does have potential pitfalls that must be avoided, 
however, particularly in historical scholarship. In a recent article, Evan Dawley points to the 
lessons learned in the field of United States History, which was enriched and its understanding of 
American politics and society made more accurate through the greater incorporation of the 
historical plight of minorities, African Americans in particular.29 The problem of the 
representation of Taiwanese aboriginals is not the same, however. The situation of Taiwanese 
aboriginals is far more reminiscent of the great historic tragedy of Native Americans. Although 
the history of how Native American culture and their physical persons were systematically 
brutalized and exterminated undoubtedly speaks as to the character of American society and the 
people it was composed of; as a result of the largely successful campaigns to exterminate or 
assimilate them by the 20th century they no longer played a major role in events in the USA, and 
we would rightly view any attempt to construct an American nationalism based on the suffering 
 
28 An excellent cultural example of this is the 2008 Taiwanese romantic comedy Cape No. 7 (海角七號), the highest 
grossing domestic Taiwanese film of all time, and which was banned in the PRC. The film’s plot is based around 
unsent love letters from a Japanese teacher to his Taiwanese lover during the colonial period, which are discovered 
by a young Taiwanese postman in contemporary Taiwan, who through his attempts to deliver them is brought into a 
band being assembled by a Japanese pop star who is working in Taiwan because she is past her prime. The film 
enraged the PRC’s censors because it depicts Taiwan’s relationship with Japan as having positive aspects, and the 
makeup of the band is supposed to represent modern Taiwan and includes a Japanese woman, a Hokkien-speaking 
Han person, a mandarin speaking descendent of mainland Chinese who fled to Taiwan, and a Taiwanese aboriginal, 
among others. 
29 Dawley, Evan N. “Finding Meaning in Time and Space: Periodisation and Taiwanese-Centric History.” 
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of Natives with skepticism. Likewise, by the end of the Japanese Colonial period, the vast 
majority of Taiwan’s plains aboriginals had been totally assimilated into the Han ethnic majority, 
freely intermarrying with Han people and adopting their cultural practices and even names.30 The 
mountain-dwelling aboriginals did not assimilate in this way, but they lived largely separate from 
Han society and played little role in it. One must therefore be wary of the drive to incorporate the 
aboriginals as a major aspect of Taiwan’s modern history and their deployment in the 
construction of Taiwanese nationalism, as it reeks of cynical appropriation of aboriginal 
suffering and culture to legitimize a separate national identity for Taiwan’s Han residents.   
 
Historiographic Trends in Post-War Taiwan 
 After the Nationalist retreat to Taiwan in the late 1940s, the theme of the master narrative 
of KMT-sanctioned historiography was that, since the beginning of the “century of humiliation” 
in the 1800s, China had been preyed upon and exploited by Western imperial powers and the 
Japanese, but that this humiliation was continuously and vigorously resisted by noble Chinese 
patriots “out of a desire for autonomy and prosperity.”31  A-chin Hsiau locates the KMT  
interpretation of the historical relationship of Taiwan to the Chinese mainland as embedded 
within this master narrative, and that it emphasized six key elements: 
1) the sanguine, historical, and cultural connections between local Taiwanese and 
Mainlanders; 2) the contribution made to the development and cultivation of the frontier 
island of Taiwan by imperial China before Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895; 3) the 
 
30 Brown, Melissa J. “Changing Authentic Identities.” 465. 
31 Hsiau, A-chin. “Narrating Taiwan out of the Chinese Empire.”  98. 
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nationalist sentiment and attachment to the ancestral land, the Chinese mainland, of 
Taiwanese compatriots; 4) the influence of the KMT-led nationalist revolution in the 
early twentieth century on Taiwanese anti-Japanese activities; 5) the contribution of the 
eight-year Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945) fought by the KMT to liberate Taiwan from 
colonial rule; and 6) the task the Taiwanese should shoulder in retaking the mainland.32  
As evidenced by the above, the KMT sought to downplay or even portray as entirely negative the 
role of the Japanese in developing the Taiwanese society and economy, and furthermore they 
placed all the positive emphasis on the influence of imperial China and the role of KMT-led 
nationalist government in liberating Taiwan from Japanese occupation.  The KMT canonized 
“orthodox” Chinese culture and the Mandarin Chinese language, and sought to “re-instill” them 
among the Taiwanese through its post-war Sinicization campaigns, while at the same time 
suppressing local Han Chinese culture and practices, as well as the Taiwanese Hokkien language 
and Japanese, which was the only written language that most Taiwanese people knew.33 
 This phenomenon of trying to cement a national identity that supports the legitimacy of 
the state through the total casting out of the previous ruling power’s historical narrative, as well 
as their language and culture, is not unique to the KMT. The Japanese sought to turn the 
Taiwanese into “subjects of the Japanese emperor” (皇民化運動), which they thought could be 
achieved through the teaching of Japanese language and history to the Taiwanese.34 The teaching 
of Japanese history, similar to the KMT’s view on teaching Chinese history, was done with the 
objective of in introducing the Taiwanese to the Japanese “national polity” and to cultivate a 
 
32 Hsiau, A-chin. “Narrating Taiwan out of the Chinese Empire.” 99. 
33 Hsiau, A-chin. “Narrating Taiwan out of the Chinese Empire.” 99. 
34 臺灣獨立運動史. 52. 
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“national spirit.”35 It was not just these outsiders who came to Taiwan and sought to legitimize 
their rule who did this though; since the 1970-80’s36 a major movement has emerged in Taiwan 
to throw out or de-Sinicize the historical narrative of the KMT (中國史觀) and replace it with a 
historical narrative focused on the island itself (臺灣史觀). A-chin Hsiau identifies that the 
Japanification, Sinicization, and Taiwanification of history are all merely different sides of the 
same coin—they all seek to suppress or erase the previous narrative while simultaneously 
constructing a new one that will facilitate the formation of a new national identity.37 Taiwan, 
much like Manchukuo, has been the site of attempts to construct a multiplicity of different 
nationalisms, and accordingly has the potential to serve as a unique case study into the study of 
nationalism(s). 
 A legacy of the KMT’s rule and the Cold War is the tendency, particularly for scholars in 
the West, to ignore leftist political movements and narratives in Taiwan. For Taiwanese 
historians the goal of contemporary Taiwanese historiography is to forge a new imagined 
community through the othering of mainland China. This perhaps has contributed to the 
downplaying of the history of the Taiwanese socialist and communist movements because they 
would bring about a closer relationship or identification with the ostensibly communist 
mainland. That being said, there has still been far more scholarship on this topic produced in 
Taiwan than in the West, and although this may be in part because western historians are 
sympathetic to the geopolitical plight of the Taiwanese and their desire to forge a new Taiwanese 
 
35 Cited in Hsiau, A-chin. Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism. 151. 
36 For a more in-depth exploration of changing Taiwanese historiographic trends since the 1970’s consult A-chin 
Hsiau’s excellent work on that topic. 
37 Hsiau, A-chin. Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism. 152. 
 
 24  
 
nationalism, it is almost certain that the legacy of cold war ideology which cast Taiwan as “Free 
China” is a major contributing factor.  
 
Writing Against Empire: Historiographic Writing and Leftwing Political Movements in 
Exile 
 In December of 1993, under the cover of darkness, a man arrived in Taiwan aboard a 
fishing boat, completing a long secretive journey from Japan. As the isle of Formosa 
materialized out of the darkness in front of him, he laid his eyes on his homeland for the first 
time in almost 42 years of exile, and at a location very near to the one he landed at when he fled 
the Chinese mainland in 1949. The man was Su Beng, a Taiwanese Marxist revolutionary, 
historian, and a longtime leader of the Taiwanese independence movement in exile.38 His return 
was indicative of just how much Taiwanese society had changed since the lifting of martial law 
in July 1987. Although he had inspired many a Taiwanese independence activist during the 
height of martial law in the 1960’s, he returned to a Taiwan where the independence movement 
and its accompanying discourses were firmly located within the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), which was based on a political ideology of Liberalism that markedly conflicted with his 
own Marxist views. The Marxist narrative that characterized his historiographic writing on 
Taiwan and made him one of the most prominent advocates of Taiwanese independence in exile, 
it seemed, had fallen out of favor. 
Prior to the end of martial law and democratization there were no historiographic works 
produced or discussions of the history of leftwing movements occurring within Taiwan itself. 
 
38 Han, Cheung. “Taiwan in Time: Revolutionary in Exile.” Taipei Times, November 5, 2017. 
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This topic was even largely banned and forgotten within the communist People’s Republic of 
China on the mainland, with many former Taiwanese Communist Party members who had 
managed to flee the Japanese and KMT to the mainland eventually being purged by the CCP. 
Xie Xuehong, the former General Secretary of the TCP, was denounced and punished in 1957 
during the Anti-Rightist Campaign for “viciously undermining the relations between the people 
of Taiwan and the people of the motherland.”39 Ironically enough, these topics could only be 
openly written about in Taiwan’s former colonizer, Japan, and it is there that they received the 
most sympathetic international response to their agitation for Taiwanese independence. The best 
known and most influential of these writers were Ong Iok-tek and Su Beng. 
 Su Beng was born in Taiwan in 1918 during the height of Japanese colonial rule 
of the island, and studied political economy in Tokyo at Waseda University, where he read the 
works of Karl Marx and became a fervent revolutionary. He traveled to mainland China to 
participate in the ongoing war against the Japanese and Communist revolution in the 1940’s, but 
quickly became disillusioned with the growing totalitarianism of the Chinese Communist Party 
and returned to Taiwan in 1949, where he soon began to organize against the Kuomintang-led 
nationalist Chinese government. In 1951 a plot to assassinate Chiang Kai-shek that he was 
involved in was discovered by the police, and he was forced to flee to Japan. After arriving in 
Japan he decided that the way to liberate Taiwan from the oppressive government that had taken 
root there was to educate the Taiwanese about their history, and so he adopted the pen name Su 
Beng (史明, literally “to make history clear”) and set about writing a comprehensive history of 
the 400 year cycle of colonialism and exploitation in Taiwan, Taiwan’s 400 Year History. 
 
39 Hsiao, Frank S. T., and Lawrence R. Sullivan. “A Political History of the Taiwanese Communist Party.” 286. 
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Ong Iok-tek had a similar upbringing and life, although he never engaged in 
revolutionary activity like Su Beng did. Ong was born in 1924 in Tainan to a prominent family 
of the local community. He began university studies during the second world war at Tokyo 
University, but he returned to Taiwan early without finishing his education due to the ongoing 
military conflict. After the handover of Taiwan to the nationalist-led Republic of China 
government he became a prominent critic of the KMT. In 1949 it became clear to him that his 
life was in danger under the new government and he fled to Japan, where he would eventually 
die in exile many decades later. He resumed his studies upon arriving in Japan and completed his 
PhD at Tokyo University in 1969. He played a prominent role in many Taiwanese independence 
organizations and publications in Japan, the most well known of which being the Taiwan Youth 
Association. In his capacity as a leading independence activist and intellectual he wrote his opus 
Taiwan: A History of Agonies, with the intention of showing the history of Taiwan as a series of 
ethnic conflicts, in order to argue that Hoklo and Hakka Han residents of Taiwan, through these 
conflicts and development under Japanese colonial capitalism, had established an independent 
national consciousness (i.e. an imagined Taiwanese national community). 
 Both men’s historical narratives characterize the history of Taiwan as a never-ending 
cycle of invasion and exploitation, but where they primarily differ is how they characterize the 
nature of these conflicts. For Su Beng, modern Taiwan history travels through a cycle of 
domination by Qing dynasty elites, Japanese imperial capitalists, through to the contemporary 
predicament at the time he wrote the book of Taiwan being the focus of a never-ending storm of 
conflict between KMT mainland imperializing fascists and the forces of socialist-imperialism 
under the mainland CCP. Su Beng recognizes capitalism, with its internal logic and drive to 
expand, systematize, and integrate all markets under one hegemonic power structure, as the 
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primary force behind these conflicts. Ong Iok-tek recognizes essentially the same cycle of 
invasion and oppression, but he does not read capitalism as the engine of these agonies. He sees 
ethnic conflict, first between the Hoklo and Hakka migrants and the aboriginals, then between all 
those groups and the Japanese, and then between all those groups and the mainlanders, as the 
driving force behind events in Taiwan.  
 Although these two men differ in their political ideology and in the narratives they write 
for Taiwanese history, they both do something that was unique prior to the collapse of martial 
law in Taiwan—they include the Taiwanese Communist Party within their historiographic 
writing and attempt to provide a historical narrative that can be deployed in the construction of a 
Taiwanese nationalism. Their respective portrayals of the TCP differ significantly, however, but 
not in a way that is inconsistent with the overall very different ways that they read Taiwanese 
history.  Ong very clearly prioritizes the national liberation aspect of the TCP and downplays, to 
an extent that is not consistent with most other scholarship on the TCP, the role of CCP in the 
TCP’s affairs and activities, and putting much more emphasis on the nurturing role that the 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) played. He summarizes his views on the relationship between 
the CCP and TCP at the end of his section on the party: 
. . . the Taiwanese Communists had no relations with the current leaders of the Chinese 
Communist party. . . who lay hidden in the French Concession then. Their contacts were 
scanty and sporadic. Hsieh Hsueh-hung [Xie Xuehong] and Lin Mu-shun sought refuge 
in the mainland after the failure in the 228 Incident, but the current Chinese Communist 
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Leaders received them with bitterness and contempt calling them “aborigine 
communists” and “local nationalists,” and in the end ruthlessly purged them all.40   
Most other scholarship, including Su Beng’s, does not support these claims about the lack of a 
CCP role in the TCP. The rest of the information is correct based on what would have been 
known in Japan and Taiwan at the time, there was no way Ong could know that Xie Xuehong 
and other TCP members would be rehabilitated after Deng Xiaoping’s ascent to power in 1976, 
largely so they could advocate for his proposal of “one country, two systems” for Taiwan. 
 Su Beng, on the other hand, portrays the TCP not as a nationalist movement, though he 
certainly characterizes it as a national liberation movement, and instead focuses on the 
international character of the party and its support, as well its role in supporting the development 
of class consciousness among Taiwanese for the first time. He emphasizes that “the party took a 
serious view of the connection between the Communist Party of Japan and the Communist party 
of China,” and points out that representatives of the CCP and Korean Communist Party were 
present at the establishing ceremony. He acknowledges what I will also put forth as one of the 
most important facts about the Taiwanese Communist Party, that it clearly states “national 
independence” for Taiwan as one of its goals in its political outline, and was “the first time in 
Taiwanese history that the existence of ‘Taiwan the nation’ was recognized clearly and 
absolutely.”41 
 The historical significance of the Taiwanese Communist Party within the Taiwanese 
independence tradition begins to become clear after examining these two incredibly important 
pieces of historiography, but even more important than their content is what the conditions of 
 
40 Ong Iok-tek. Taiwan: A History of Agonies. 200. 
41 Su, Beng. 110. 
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their production tell us about the historiographic writing of Taiwan—pro-Taiwanese 
independence historiography and historiography of left-wing political movements could only be 
produced outside of the Sinophone world. Here we see the intimate link between the Taiwanese 
independence movement, left-wing political movements, and Taiwanese intellectuals in exile. 
Although their efforts may not have directly contributed to the end of martial law in Taiwan, 
their contributions to the intellectual tradition of Taiwanese independence and the construction of 
Taiwanese nationalism, as well as the links between the socialist movement and the Taiwanese 
independence movement, could perhaps serve to complicate our understanding of modern 
Taiwanese History. 
 
Strains of Taiwanese Independence  
 It is important to note that the leftist Taiwanese independence movements of the TCP and 
Su Beng are not the direct precursors to the contemporary version of Taiwanese independence 
that is embodied by the DPP or the young radicals of Taiwan. The contemporary strain of 
Taiwanese independence thinking can be better traced back to the demands of Taiwan’s Hokkien 
speaking upper class and intellectuals for a greater say in local Taiwanese affairs under both the 
Japanese and KMT. They made a great deal of progress towards this goal under the Japanese 
only to see it all rolled back with the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War. After the defeat of 
the Japanese, a wary KMT was unwilling to allow participatory government for a population that 
it felt had been “spiritually corrupted” by the colonizer, and would first need to be subjected to a 
brutal re-Sinicization campaign before such privileges could even be considered. The flight into 
exile or execution of all Taiwanese leftists left only these more liberal ideologies for rising 
leaders and activists to draw upon when formulating their political positions and strategies. 
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Although the Taiwanese leftists continued to organize in exile, they never managed to have a 
substantial political impact on the island again.  
 The DPP can be directly traced back to the Tangwai42 movement that began in the mid-
1970’s, which marked the beginning of non-KMT candidates contesting local elections and often 
winning. Political parties other than the KMT were still banned at this time, so these candidates 
would run as independents. The candidates themselves were seeking to address the issues of 
Taiwan’s local Hokkien-speaking majority, who up until that point were neglected by the KMT 
at the best of times and actively oppressed at the worst. This marked the first time that the KMT 
allowed the domination of Taiwanese society by mainlanders to relax a little, and the first time 
participatory government was allowed since the Japanese surrender. Su Beng and his allies began 
to lose any kind of real political influence they still had with Taiwanese intellectuals and radicals 
at this time, the new generation of western-educated Taiwanese activists had no interest in the 
violent revolution advocated by Su Beng. When presented with the choice of going to the West 
to study electoral politics and electioneering or going to Su Beng’s Tokyo restaurant to learn 
how to make bombs and join what was essentially a terrorist cell, most chose the former. With 
peaceful reform looking more and more plausible, fewer and fewer young people were willing to 
pay the costs of fighting for a total and immediate revolution.  
 Another factor that led to the gradual loss of influence within the Taiwanese 
independence movement for Su Beng was that his opus, Taiwan’s 400 Year History, was written 
in Japanese, which was banned from being used or taught by the KMT shortly after they took 
control of the island. Over time, less and less Taiwanese people possessed the ability to even 
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read his book, which did not receive a translation to Chinese until 1980, 18 years after its 
original publication. Su Beng could not speak Mandarin, which precluded him from working 
with the anti-KMT activists of Taiwan’s ruling mainlander minority as well. The primary 
generation that would have been influenced by his work is the generation of Taiwanese that grew 
up under Japanese rule, Lee Teng-hui would be a notable example. Among this generation, 
especially those who studied or worked abroad, his book was extraordinarily popular, the way it 
was written easily lent itself to an anti-Japanese, anti-CCP, and anti-KMT reading. This was 
incredibly useful and appealing for those who wanted to distance themselves from all the extent 
political players and ideologies and move towards a liberal-democratic order instead. It was also 
one of only a handful of books on the history of Taiwan that existed at the time, so if one wanted 
to construct a historical justification for a Taiwanese nation or to politically identify with the 
island rather than China, it was one of the only potential sources for one to draw upon.  
 During the second half of the 1980’s, the Tangwai movement formally crystallized into 
the DPP and Chiang Ching-kuo and the KMT leadership ended martial law and began the slow 
march towards democratization. After Chiang’s unexpected death, the rule of Taiwan passed for 
the first time into a non-mainlander’s hands as Lee Teng-hui assumed power. Over time it 
became clear that Lee’s predilection toward Taiwanese independence was even greater than that 
of the fledgling DPP, which would eventually lead to a disintegration of the KMT that they have 
never really recovered from. Lee’s suspicion and distrust of the mainland, having been most 
likely influenced by the writings of Su Beng and Lee’s own experience as a young communist 
revolutionary, would lead him to impose extremely harsh restrictions on economic relations with 
mainland China, almost completely banning Taishang from investing in mainland China. These 
restrictions were greatly loosened by Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s first DPP president, and 
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loosened even more under Ma Ying-jeou. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, even now under 
Tsai Ying-wen economic relations with the PRC are for more open than they were under Lee 
Teng-hui. In these political actions one can see the reflection of Su Beng’s fear of the “socialist 
imperialism” of the CCP and a distinct disinclination to sanction the economic colonization of 
the PRC by Taishang, all ideas with a distinctly Marxist origin. Much like the idea that greater 
economic and cultural exchange between the PRC and Hong Kong would lead to the political 
liberalization of the PRC, the idea that similar exchanges between the PRC and Taiwan will lead 
to a desire for democratization in the mainland has proven to be false.  
 Under DPP ideology, it is very much possible to support economic integration with the 
PRC and yet still be pro-Taiwanese independence. Some advocate for a greater exchange with 
the PRC in order to influence it. This is best exemplified by a theory developed to explain similar 
thinking in Hong Kong, the concept of “Northbound Colonialism.” Law Wing-sang best 
describes this concept in the following: 
. . . for the new breed of Hong Kong red capitalists, the vast hinterland of China is an 
unlimited space, a new virgin frontier for capitalist colonization. Border crossings 
between one’s self and Other, past and present, and material interests and spiritual 
redemption and bargaining between locality, nationality, and global ties and links are all 
possible within the reaches of the business empire, and behind all this is the smart, hard-
working Hong Kong character. This is also where the affirmation of a Hong Kong 
identity is concomitant with the assertion of an imperial desire. . . . imagining themselves 
as the steam engines of Chinese modernization . . .43 
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This is to say, that Hong Kong capitalists view their role vis-à-vis the mainland the same as the 
British saw their role with respect to Hong Kong; that of spreading civilization and economic 
prosperity through exploitation. They believe their earlier and more extensive economic 
development makes them superior, to the extent that “this chauvinistic sense of pride over a 
backward China is so widespread as to constitute as much a class ideology as a popular 
hegemony.”44  
 I believe this Northbound Colonialism framework can be applied just as effectively to 
Taiwan as well as Hong Kong, a “Cross-Strait Colonialism,” if you will. The Taishang, much 
like the Hong Kong capitalist, sees himself as coming from a more developed and civilized 
place, and bringing progress and development with him through his investments and other 
dealings. The Taishang and the Hong Kong capitalist credit China’s rapid success to themselves, 
rather than to any policy or effort by the CCP. The difference lies in that the Taishang, unlike his 
counterpart from Hong Kong, is also more politically developed, in so much as Taiwan 
successfully self-democratized whereas Hong Kong never managed totally independent 
democratic self-rule under the British or the PRC. If the Taishang views himself as Chinese, it is 
as the full realization what a Chinese person should be, the idea of regressing back to being 
under the “backwards” mainlanders is unthinkable. The popularity and presence of Taiwan’s 
brands and products throughout the mainland merely serves to reinforce this sense of superiority, 
as Law describes here;  
Even the sternest skeptics of the Chinese communist regime find solace in being able to 
discern a Hong Kong cultural presence embodied in all commercial icons found in 
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Chinese cities and other, more backwards places. As a result, Hong Kong northbound 
colonialism is successfully under way as a creeping civilizing mission lacking only a 
church and a clergy.45 
The Taishang views integration with the mainland as a way to make the mainland more like 
Taiwan, rather than a way for Taiwan to become more like the mainland, thus the PRC’s policies 
to encourage economic integration and cross-strait investment actually reinforce the Taishang’s 
sense of Taiwanese identity. In their attempts to proactively entice or coerce Taiwan back into 
national union, the PRC leadership seems to have failed to realize that although some may have 
an appetite for integration in Taiwan, there is essentially no one who wants to live in a society 
organized and run by the PRC, which the vast majority of Taiwanese still very much consider to 
be “backwards.”  
 This type thinking is unacceptable for Su Beng and his comrades, as their goal would not 
be to just sever relations with China and reorient Taiwanese investment to Southeast Asia, but 
rather to extirpate Taiwan entirely from the matrix of oppression that characterizes international 
trade. Equally unacceptable are recent slashes to the Taiwanese welfare state made under the 
DPP. One of the things that makes the Taiwanese independence movement fascinating as a 
social phenomenon is the way that it is made up of individuals and groups with completely 
incompatible political ideologies, the single unifying theme generally just being an opposition to 
authoritarianism and both the CPP and KMT. There is also often a certain level of romanization 
of the Japanese Colonial Period, but this is generally done just to infuriate the One-China 
nationalist leaders of both of said parties; it is intended to be provocative. A TCP member would 
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also most likely take issue with the way that supporting Taiwanese independence has become a 
market strategy for many Taiwanese companies. It is not uncommon for a book, film, or even 
video game that is published in Taiwan to see a massive uptick in domestic sales after it has been 
banned in China. 
 From this information one can glean that there are two primary strains of Taiwanese 
independence thought: the liberal-democratic ideas that originated in the Tangwai movement and 
came to be embodied by the DPP, and the radical Marxist ideology that advocated for violent 
revolution that has largely died out in contemporary times. Su Beng was ideologically isolated 
from the Independence movement upon his return to Taiwan in the 1990’s, but that did not stop 
him from supporting its advocates even if he did not personally agree with their liberal-
democratic views. He attempted to reinvent himself as the “grandfather of Taiwanese 
Independence,” and worked as an activist full time. He formed an organization that copied the 
tactic of employing gaisensha,46 cars with loudspeaker systems built into them to deliver 
messages while traveling around a city, that he had often seen used by Japanese political parties. 
Every weekend he would drive around Taipei broadcasting recorded messages advocating for 
Taiwanese independence around Taipei. He became a celebrity of sorts, Taiwan’s very own Che 
Guevara, expressing an interest in or support for him came to be seen as chic within Taiwan’s 
youth culture. 
 His most lasting influence, however, was upon the field of Taiwanese history, which he is 
one of the founders of. A great intellectual debt is owed to him by all those who study this field, 
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Taiwanese history to not mention him at least once. Without the Taiwan-centric understanding of 
the island’s history that he helped to develop, it would be essentially impossible for the 
individuals that the Taiwanese independence movement is composed of to construct a coherent 
historical narrative to justify their newfound nationalism. For this reason, until his death, he 
could be often found at public events with Freddy Lim, Lee Teng-hui, or other prominent 
independence activists where they would heap great praise upon him and urge all attendees that 
had not already done so to buy his book. He found a place for himself as a sort of spiritual leader 
for young radicals, who they idolized as someone who had risked death and exile to stand up for 
their common principles, and most importantly, he was revered for giving them a sense of 
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Chapter 2 
Long Live the Taiwanese People’s Independence [臺灣人民獨立萬歲]47: The Taiwanese 
Communist Party and the National Liberation Movement 
[Part of the CCP’s] External policy . . . [is to] support the independence 
movements of the peoples of Korea and Taiwan. —Liu Shaoqi48 
If the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese Imperialism, we 
will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The 
same thing applies to Taiwan. —Mao Zedong49 
 
 The Taiwanese Communist Party (TCP) uniquely stands out from most of Taiwan’s 
modern history in that it not only challenges the nationalist narratives of the KMT and 
contemporary Taiwanese liberal independence activists, but also through its relationship with the 
Comintern and the CCP embodies the recent origin of the PRC’s claims to the island. Although 
the TCP only existed for less than a decade before being annihilated by the Japanese colonial 
administration and never even came close to achieving its political goals, its relationship with the 
international communist movement and its own stated mission of “national liberation” for 
Taiwan can be used to interestingly problematize the current independence movement’s 
historical narrative.   
 During the Japanese Colonial period there were a number of political movements which 
opposed Japanese rule, but there was only one political group that sought to work outside the 
political system established by the Japanese and engage in a direct confrontation for the national 
liberation of Taiwan, that group was the Taiwanese Communist Party.  From its earliest 
 
47 Cited from the 1928 TCP political outline in 臺灣獨立運動史. 52. 
48 Cited in Lan, Shi-Chi Mike. “THE AMBIVALENCE OF NATIONAL IMAGINATION.” 187. 
49 Cited in Lan, Shi-Chi Mike. “THE AMBIVALENCE OF NATIONAL IMAGINATION.” 187. 
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beginnings the TCP was born of two fathers, the Chinese Communist Party and the Japanese 
Communist Party, and would be characterized by ideological conflict between two factions that 
identified with the two father parties. The TCP was formally established and chartered in 
Shanghai in 1928, almost all of its founding members were also members of the Chinese 
Communist Party, and the establishing meeting was chaired by a local Shanghai CCP member. 
The TCP’s political outline, which would certainly throw a contemporary CCP cadre into a rage 
upon reading it, was not only tacitly but even openly endorsed by the CCP hierarchy. 
 Despite the intimate links between the TCP and CCP from the moment of its formal 
incorporation as a branch of the Comintern, the TCP political outline was not written in Chinese 
and nor was it written with the help or consultation of mainland CCP members, but rather it was 
written in Japanese under the tutelage of Japanese Communist Party members in Tokyo. 
Japanese was the obvious choice for the language of the party political outline, as it was the only 
language most Taiwanese people were able to read, if they were literate at all. Furthermore, the 
TCP was not established as a branch party of the CCP; in 1928 it was originally incorporated 
into the Comintern as a “nationality branch” of the Japanese Communist Party, again with the 
full support and backing of the CCP. 
 In order to properly understand the significance of the TCP’s status as a nationality 
branch of the JCP, and the even more significant promotion of the TCP to an independent party 
in 1931, one must have a thorough understanding of the structure of the international communist 
movement as it was formally incorporated under the auspices of the Communist International. 
The Comintern operated under a principle of “one country, one party” and accordingly any 
individual state would only have one party, but in recognition of the many nations living under 
imperial subjugation the Comintern included a nationality branch system. A nationality branch 
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was a separate party organization to serve one of these subjugated nations, that was a branch of 
the imperializing nation’s communist party. Nationality branches had the possibility of later 
being upgraded to full independent parties if, after a period of instruction and training by the 
primary party, the Comintern leadership believed the situation suitable to revolution and the 
expulsion of the colonizers.50 An independent party was understood to be the rightful ruler of an 
independent state after the revolution, meaning that the when the TCP was promoted to an 
independent party in 1931 that the Comintern leadership, as well as the CCP and JCP, planned 
for and supported Taiwan to be an independent nation-state after the war. 
 The leader of the TCP until 1931, as mentioned before, was a Taiwanese woman named 
Xie Xuehong who was trained in the Soviet Union for the task of organizing the revolution in 
Taiwan. She and Lin Mushan, who was also trained in the USSR, would form the core of the 
TCP’s leadership until 1931, and represented the pro-JCP faction of the party. Frank Hsiao and 
Lawrence Sullivan postulate that Xie Xuehong and Lin Mushan received their primary influence 
from Japanese Communist Party theorists, such as Yamakawa Hitoshi and Fukumoto Kazuo. 
Yamakawa-ism and Fukumoto-ism would both be denounced as deviations by the Comintern, 
which would play a role in Xie and Lin’s eventual fall from power in the party. Both Yamakawa 
and Fukumoto claimed to be adapting Marxism to the peculiarities of Japanese Capitalism, and 
appropriately developed wildly different revolutionary strategies from the orthodox positions 
endorsed by the Comintern.  
Yamakawa thought that unlike Western Capitalism, Japanese Capitalism was infested 
with “feudal remnants,” and therefore he developed his theory of “a single proletarian party” 
 
50 Hsiao, Frank S. T., and Lawrence R. Sullivan. 272. 
 
 40  
 
which stated that “the entire proletariat should form a single political power, the proletarian 
party, which need not abide by the higher goals and thesis of the party.”51 This greatly 
diminished the role of the communist party as the vanguard of the revolution, and its emphasis 
on the party as a purely intellectual organization contributed to the development of Fukumoto-
ism and the intense focus on intellectual refinement and lesser prioritization of mass struggle by 
the TCP. For Fukumoto, the highest priority of the party was “the molding of an ideologically 
pure intellectual elite” that “needed to precede the organization of popular support, insuring 
against any potential compromise with the masses’ ‘backward’ consciousness.”52 The influence 
of Fukumoto-ism in the TCP under the leadership of Xie Xuehong and Lin Mushan is very clear, 
as the party was mainly focused on intellectual and ideological debate among its members, with 
very little effort devoted to organizing mass action.  
The party platform outlined four clear primary goals:  
1. Overthrow Japanese imperialist rule and achieve the independence of Taiwan; 2. 
Confiscate properties, lands, businesses, and banks in Taiwan owned by Japanese 
imperialists; 3. Implement land reform and eliminate the feudalistic system of 
exploitation; 4. Build an independent and democratic government in Taiwan.53 
It is highly unlikely that the democratic government that they were referring to when writing 
their platform and slogans such as “Establish the Taiwan Republic [建立台灣共和國]”54 was a 
competitive multiparty liberal democracy, but rather a Leninist party-state based on “democratic 
centralism” such as the USSR or the future PRC. Still, it is interesting to note the intimate link 
 
51 Cited from Yamakawa in Hsiao, Frank S. T., and Lawrence R. Sullivan. 282-3. 
52 Hsiao, Frank S. T., and Lawrence R. Sullivan. 283. 
53 Ong, Iok-tek. 198. 
54 台灣獨立運動史. 51. 
 
 41  
 
between class struggle and national liberation, and in fact a source of great conflict within the 
party was whether to align themselves with the “national bourgeoisie” and engage in a united 
front for national liberation or not.  This debate would be ended decisively, however, due to the 
intervention of the Comintern in 1931. 
 At that time a political coup within the party was organized by the members of the pro-
CCP faction, who had been the TCP leaderships’ sole points of contact with the Comintern. 
These pro-CCP individuals had been incessantly saturating their written reports back to the 
Comintern with criticism of Xie Xuehong and her leadership, particularly her practice of the 
prohibited “deviations” of Yamakawa-ism and Fukumoto-ism. The Comintern’s Far Eastern 
Bureau moved swiftly to sever the TCP from the JCP, with the eager support of the CCP, 
promoting the TCP from a nationality branch to a fully independent party, and expelling Xie 
Xuehong and Lin Mushan from the TCP. The TCP now returned its strategy to the orthodox one 
espoused by the Comintern and the CCP, one of organizing the masses for revolution against the 
Japanese. In the end this would prove to be the TCP’s undoing, however, as the increased 
frequency of incidents of rural and industrial labor agitation led to the Japanese colonial 
administration swiftly cracking down on the party. All of its members would be dead, in prison, 
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The Science of Successful Revolution 
The greatest international issue for the [Japanese] Communist Party is to 
organize an effective struggle against a second war of imperialism, and to link it 
with the struggle of the Soviet Union and positive support of and liaison with the 
revolutionary movements in Korea and Taiwan.  —JCP Theses55  
The Present war is being waged against the Chinese Nationalist military clique, 
which is the agent of European and American capital and which supports the old 
order. The objective of the war is the liberation of 400 million Chinese. Since the 
War involves the expansion of the Japanese nation into a country that is 
remarkably backward in culture compared to Japan, it is in accord with the 
principle of historical progress. —Sano and Nabeyama, JCP Defectors56  
 
 To understand Taiwanese Marxism it is necessary to first examine Japanese Marxism, 
particularly its route of transmission from the west and the reasons why it was adopted by local 
radicals. Prior to the Bolshevik revolution Marxism had little currency among the various study 
societies or labor movements that were home to the majority of radicals in East Asia at the time, 
and Japan was not an exception to this. The opening of the floodgates to western ideas had left 
these radicals with such a vast array of new theories to choose from that they struggled to 
familiarize themselves with all of the arguments before leaping into the political scene to 
advocate for their chosen theory. Over time, however, what precisely made a good theory began 
to crystallize in their minds: which theory could best present itself as the science of successful 
revolution.57 Marxism, which had always claimed to be the scientific explanation of man’s social 
and economic world, immediately began to be championed by radicals as soon as the Bolshevik 
Revolution made it the most successful revolutionary ideology.  
 
55 Cited in Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945. 205. 
56 Cited in Beckmann and Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945. 247. 
57 Scalapino. 13. 
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 Socialism was first brought to Japan by Christian intellectuals after the conclusion of the 
first Sino-Japanese War, but at that time Marx was just one of many socialist theorists to them 
and his works were likewise accorded no more preference than those of any of the others read by 
the study societies (e.g. Henry George, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Blanc, Proudhon, Lassalle, Bebel, 
etc.). The philosophical orientation of these early societies’ members was generally towards 
Christian humanism, which had a lasting and indelible legacy on the Japanese Socialist 
movement that made its members far more predisposed to pacificism and genuine 
internationalism than other Socialist movements in East Asia. These early socialists were 
committed to achieving their political objectives through the parliamentary process and through 
peaceful agitation via the labor movement, and it would not be until their political movements 
and study societies, as well as the labor movement itself, were banned or suppressed that 
alternative currents of thought would begin to emerge among left-wing radicals. By 1906 the 
suppressive pressure applied to the movement by the government split Japan’s socialists into two 
primary factions: peaceful reformers—who were still largely Christian social democrats with an 
affinity for Tosltoyan thought and universal suffrage—and the violent revolutionaries. The 
revolutionaries had come to look upon the dimension of socialism derived from Christian 
spirituality, as well as the Christians themselves, with contempt; they now derived their ideas 
from the materialism of Marxist and anarcho-syndicalist philosophy.58  
 Anarcho-syndicalism was the dominant strain of socialism in Japan into the early 1920’s, 
which caused a number of problems for Japan’s integration into the international socialist 
movement. For example, when the Comintern called the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far 
East in January, 1922, almost all of Japan’s representatives—who due to Japan’s lack of a 
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communist party attended using American Communist Party membership cards—were in fact 
anarchists, not budding communists. To get anyone to attend the Comintern representative had to 
say that anarchists were welcome as well, because they would be won over by communism at the 
meeting. Communism, and the Marxism upon which it is based, would not really begin to 
become popular until it became clear among radicals that the anarchist revolutionary strategy 
was a complete failure and was unlikely to ever find any success. As Anarchist labor unions 
began to be crushed by the government or abandoned by their membership, it became clear that 
such a disorganized approach was flawed from the outset. It was only then that Marxism began 
to dominate the discourse and assume the mantle of the science of successful revolution, which 
finally spurred the radicals to found their own national communist party, to be a full member 
party of the Communist International.59  
 By the time that the international socialist movement began to be organized around the 
Comintern by the Soviet Union, Japan was already an imperial power in its own right, with 
colonies dispersed throughout East Asia. This led to marked differences in the Marxism and 
political movements of Japanese Communists from other East Asia Marxists. The appeal of the 
ideology in China or Korea was largely based upon its prediction and advocacy of the end of the 
colonization of weaker nations by imperialists, and the eventual triumph of the weak over the 
powerful. Many Chinese nationalists were drawn to Communism out of their desire for China to 
return to what they saw as its rightful position as the most powerful nation in the world, they 
naturally were drawn to an ideology that stressed the moral superiority of the weak over the 
strong. In Japan there was no such drive to “rejuvenate” the nation through socialist revolution; it 
was never about national strength for the Japanese communists. Indeed, there were even some 
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Japanese Marxists who believed that Japan was obligated to colonize the rest of East Asia so that 
they might bring their more advanced productive forces to those more feudal societies, thus 
hastening the coming of global communism.60 Others thought that a great workers’ state could be 
established in Japan and her colonies, where Japanese revolutionaries could shepherd their more 
primitive colonial subjects into the utopia. The best example of this kind of thinking were the 
defectors Sano and Nabeyama, who wrote the following: 
Today Japan belongs among the great powers of the world. This is the result of (1) firm 
national unity, expressed in the state and the monarchy; (2) internal social cohesion; (3) 
the role of the family as the basic social unit; (4) the high productivity of workers; and (5) 
the cumulative genius of Eastern culture. Japan stands among those nations that lead, not 
among those that are led. The concepts of independence of colonies and national 
determination are outdated bourgeois concepts; weak nations like Manchuria, Formosa,61 
and Korea should enjoy equal rights under one people’s government by merging with 
Japan, which is economically close to them.62  
 All of these ideas were abhorrent to the leadership of the Comintern, which believed that this 
sort of relationship would exist but it would be all the other peoples of the world being led by a 
revolutionary vanguard of Russians, and all such Japanese thinkers were denounced for their 
ideological deviations.63 This sort of thinking was well outside the party orthodoxy, but it is a 
 
60 This is actually in line with Marx’s own thinking on the role colonialism plays in the march to socialism, as 
evidenced by his writings on India. See “The British Rule in India.” Accessed September 22, 2019. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/25.htm. 
61 Note that Taiwan is considered a distinct and separate nation from China.  
62 Cited in Beckmann and Okubo. 247. 
63 Beckmann and Okubo. 245-249. 
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very unique theory that stands in stark contrast to communist political positions in the rest of 
East Asia, which were always written from a position of national weakness, never strength.       
 The Japanese Communist Party was noted for its many arcane theoretical debates, which 
it was generally more interested in than engaging in any actual revolutionary strategy, and even 
disbanded itself for a short while. Their understanding of Japan, and the Marxism that would suit 
the Japanese situation, was written from the position of a strong capitalist nation, in contrast with 
the theories of Chinese and Russian communists, who always wrote from a position of resentful 
hatred towards those nations which were more powerful or economically developed than theirs’. 
The Japanese Communists were far more concerned with actually achieving communism than 
strengthening the nation, but most of all they were interested in adapting Marxism to their own 
situation without twisting it into fascism. Unfortunately, they did not have the time to finish 
crafting the perfect theory before they were completely crushed by the Comintern’s influence 
and persecution by the Japanese government. All of these characteristics make the Japanese 
communist movement stand out from the other East Asian movements, and they would all come 
to characterize the Taiwanese communist movement as well, and contribute to its distinctiveness 
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Chinese and Taiwanese Marxism in Dialogue 
. . . The race question has become a class question and the races, on a world 
scale, have come to confront each other as classes —Li Dazhao64 
[Be careful to avoid] that national revolutionary messianic mood which prompts 
one to see one’s own nation-state as destined to lead mankind to socialism.        
—Leon Trotsky65 
 
 A key difference between Chinese Marxism and the Marxism of Taiwan, which was 
heavily influenced by Japanese thought, is their respective relationships to nationalism. 
Taiwanese nationalism was born of Marxism, adopted as the best revolutionary strategy and only 
way to free Taiwan from its history of always being the periphery of an empire, which stands in 
stark contrast to the way that Marxism in China was popularized due to its ability to serve the 
interests of Chinese nationalism. Taiwanese Marxists found it necessary to construct a 
nationalism in order to accomplish the goals of Marxism, whereas Chinese Marxists adopted 
Marxism in order to accomplish their nationalist goals. In this way the Marxism and 
revolutionary strategy were in line with orthodox Marxist and Leninist ideas, whereas the 
Marxism of China falls into a category that Western Marxists often refer to as “nationalist 
deviation.” In order to examine this issue in greater detail, one must turn to Maurice Meisner’s 
seminal work on Chinese Marxism: Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism.  
Meisner paints a picture of the intellectual situation of China in the early 20th century, 
and what is immediately obvious to one after reading his account is that there were no Marxists 
in China prior to the outbreak of the revolution in Russia and the success of the Bolsheviks. This 
is confirmed by the absence of Marxist writings in Chinese beyond smaller excerpts, and that 
 
64 Meisner. 191. 
65 Meisner. 193. 
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there is no evidence to suggest that Marxism or socialism had any currency among Chinese 
intellectuals, unlike the situation in Japan, where scholarly interest in Marxism predated the 
Russian Revolution. Marxism, or more appropriately Marxism as turned into an actionable 
political ideology by Vladimir Lenin, appealed to Li Dazhao and other intellectuals in China 
because it seemed to be having success. Without the victories of the Bolsheviks it is unlikely that 
the global proletarian revolution foretold by Marx would have seemed to be in progress to these 
intellectuals, which certainly would have resulted in them not having much of any affinity for it, 
if they even ever become aware of it at all. The utility of Marxism, in that it provides a 
teleological understanding of history which accounts for the “century of humiliation” and 
contains a prescription for the future compatible with the Chinese desire for a great “national 
rejuvenation,” combined with the fact that the downfall of Western Capitalism and Imperialism 
seemed to be already in progress, as evidenced through the Bolshevik successes in Russia, to 
make Marxism into an extremely appealing ideology for Chinese nationalists. Furthermore, 
Marxism claimed to be a “science,” which certainly would have been appealing to early 20th 
century intellectuals, whose prevailing world view, as an overreaction to the undoubtedly 
unscientific nature of premodern Chinese thought, has been considered by some scholars to be 
based in “scientism” (i.e. the application of rationalism to all aspects of human existence and 
society)66.  
 Meisner writes that for Li Dazhao, as well as the contemporary CCP, modern Chinese 
history is essentially “the history of Chinese national resistance to imperialist aggression.”67 The 
book, when considered in its totality, appears to portray Li Dazhao, and by extension the CCP 
 
66 See Kwok, D. W. Y. Scientism in Chinese Thought: 1900-1950. Yale University Press, 1965. 
67 Meisner. 174. 
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itself, as a nationalist movement first, and a communist movement second. Meisner claims that 
this primacy of nationalism within the consciousness of Chinese communists is most visible in 
its manifestation in the thought of Li Dazhao’s most famous student, Mao Zedong. Meisner 
suggests that Chen Duxiu held views closer to those of what was at that time considered an 
orthodox European Marxist, and that this may have played some role in why the blame for the 
early struggles of the party was placed exclusively at his feet, or vice versa. Li Dazhao’s idea of 
China as a “proletarian nation” and his assertion that class struggle was in fact racial struggle all 
seem to support this line of thinking.  
 Records of the Taiwanese Communist Party primarily exist in Japanese archives and the 
archives of the Comintern in Russia, and as such are often beyond the reach of historians of 
China. Those held in Russia are particularly valuable, as the Russians in their role as the most 
“senior” revolutionaries often served as arbitrators in disputes between factions within the 
world’s myriad communist parties. Putting this kind of scholarship (the most notable of which 
being the work of Michael Share) in dialogue with Meisner’s work serves to highlight the many 
structural and ideological differences between the CCP and the TCP. For example, the TCP 
adopted an orthodox Marxist-Leninist strategy, which was to focus on the urban proletariat 
(something Taiwan had in much greater number than China did) and to not involve the peasants 
in the movement, at least not in a leadership capacity68, which was very different from the 
strategy of Li Dazhao and Mao. Furthermore, Share’s work supports the notion that the CCP 
originally supported the holding of an election to determine whether or not Taiwan would be 
independent, before later accepting the provisions of the Cairo Conference and effectively 
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supporting the unconditional return of Taiwan to the jurisdiction of Chiang Kai-shek and 
denying the right to self-determination they had once been willing to grant the Taiwanese69.  
 Within Su Beng and the TCP’s Marxist understanding of Taiwan’s history and place in 
the world one finds echoes of the ideas of another Marxist thinker: Immanuel Wallerstein. 
Wallerstein’s understanding of the world as composed of world systems, where some places are 
core to the system and some places are mere peripheries that are targeted for resource extraction, 
bears a striking resemblance to Su Beng’s understanding of Taiwan after WWII as a location 
where the Capitalist world system of the West and the Communist world system are in conflict 
over who gets to incorporate and exploit Taiwan. For Su Beng and the Taiwanese socialist 
movement, Taiwanese history is characterized by an endless cycle of colonization and 
incorporation into empires, with each new colonizer bringing with them promises of uplifting 
and development in one hand, and harsh measures designed to oppress the local people and their 
customs in order to “civilize” them and keep Taiwan as a well-oiled cog in the greater machinery 
of the empire and world system in the other. For these men and women, a socialist revolution 
organized around Taiwan as a nation-state was the only way to even have a chance to escape the 
seemingly unchangeable fate of their island to be relegated to nothing more than a periphery in 
perpetuity. Su Beng’s history of Taiwan is characterized by a strong underlying idea that Taiwan 
will always be oppressed so long as it is incorporated into a world system where the rules are 
written by those outside the island, and the it is only through educating Taiwanese on the nature 
of their 400 years history as a periphery that they will be able to achieve the kind of 
consciousness that allows them to throw off the yoke of colonial and imperial domination. For 
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these Marxists, constructing a nationalism was instrumental to the objective of liberating Taiwan, 
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Afterword 
 The construction of Taiwanese nationalism is an ongoing process, but it has passed from 
the hands of Taiwanese Marxists into those of the young liberal radicals who were behind the 
Sunflower protest movement in 2014. Among these young activists, largely born in 1990’s or 
later, there seems to already be a general amnesia of the fact there was ever a time when most 
Taiwanese people didn’t seem themselves as Taiwanese. The Taiwan that they grew up in’s 
relationship to China is far more complex than that of their Marxist forebearers, with Taiwanese 
corporations and capitalists in ever greater numbers engaged in brutal exploitation of Chinese 
laborers.70 This complicates the construction of a nationalism predicated upon an idea of Taiwan 
as a perpetual periphery, as the matrix of exploitation within the truly global capitalist world 
system that Taiwan now finds itself imbricated in with the PRC is far more opaque than that of 
the Japanese colonial period and the immediate post-war era. That these young people often 
seem unaware that Taiwanese nationalism is not in fact eternal and ancient serves as conclusive 
proof of the great success that intellectuals and activists have had in creating an imagined 
community of a Taiwanese nation, and that they are totally unaware of any Marxist influence 
indicates the great failings of the socialist movement to ever win any mainstream support during 
its heyday.  
The popular misconception among Taiwanese that what separates the island from the 
mainland is their liberal capitalist economic system could stand to be challenged. The 
independence movement in Taiwan today enjoys a wide degree of support, especially among the 
young, but despite Su Beng speaking with Li Teng-hui or appearing in public with rockstar and 
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Taiwanese independence activist Freddy Lim,71 voices like his and his Marxist critique are 
largely ignored. It is apparent from Ma Ying-Jeou’s broadly liberal policy of economic 
integration with the PRC, which is far more economically liberal than the positions of the DPP, 
that economic liberalization actually serves to tie the PRC and Taiwan closer together. The 
history of the Taiwanese Communist Party presents a powerful challenge to the traditional notion 
of the relationship of Taiwan to the Communist mainland, but it is only the beginning. More 
research and a greater understanding of these sorts of political movements are necessary, and 
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